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PROTECTING CHILDREN BY PRESERVING PARENTHOOD 
Jane C. Murphy" 
INTRODUCTION 
Establishing legal parentage, once a relatively straightforward matter of marriage 
and biology, has become increasingly complex. The determination of legal status as 
mother may now involve several women making claims based on genetic contribution, 
contract, status as gestational carrier, or other bases. I Paternity cases, while a more 
established segment of the court docket, have also become more complex. The weak-
ening of the marital presumption, increased accessibility and reliability of genetic test-
ing, and the rise in children born outside of marriage have made court intervention in 
paternity establishment more cornmon.2 
Cases involving the law's role in resolving parentage issues arise in a variety of 
contexts. Much has been written about the appropriate legal standards in cases involv-
ing competing claims of parenthood.3 In these "competing claims" cases, courts or 
legislatures are called upon to confer rights and responsibilities among two or more 
adults seeking to assume the emotional, financial, and care-taking role in a child's 
life.4 Some of these cases involve garden-variety adultery in which a father discovers 
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A. 1975, Boston College; 
J.D. 1978, New York University School of Law. I wish to thank the participants of William 
& Mary School of Law's Institute of Bill of Rights Law Roundtable on Reform of Parentage 
Law for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article and James Dwyer for organizing 
and leading the Roundtable. I also thank Christina Gochnour and Elizabeth Hiatt for their 
excellent research assistance. 
I See, e.g., R. Alta Charo, And Baby Makes Three - or Four, or Five, or Six: Redefining 
the Family After the Reprotech Revolution, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 231 (2000); Melanie B. 
Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for 
Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REv. 341 (2002); Amy M. Larkey, Redefining 
Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 
DRAKE L. REv. 605 (2003). 
2 See, e.g., Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital 
Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 547 (2000); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images 
of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 325 (2005). 
3 See supra notes 1-2; see also Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: 
Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS LJ. 597, 
602 (2002) (noting that the circumstances contributing to the "fragmentation of parentage" 
on both the maternal and paternal sides can result in as many as eight potential parents). 
4 See infra notes 8-13 and accompanying text. 
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he is not the biological father of a child born during his marriage to the child's mother.5 
Increasingly, however, competing claims cases involve parental relationships created 
from artificial reproductive technology (ART), or adoption, or both.6 These cases 
occur in a variety of family structures: families with heterosexual married parents, 
same sex couples, and single parents. What they all have in common is that, given the 
costs of the legal or medical interventions involved, there are, among the claimants, 
at least one or two potential parents with substantial resources.7 
The debate about the best choice for children when adults are competing for 
parental status is ongoing, lively, and filled with many voices. There are a variety of 
options presented to judges or lawmakers in these situations. They can take an all-or-
nothing approach and assign exclusive parenthood to one adult based upon a range 
of factors, including marital status,S biology,9 contractual intent,1O history of care-
taking, 11 and emotional attachment with the child. 12 Or the law can allow more than 
5 Unfortunately many of these adultery cases result in proceedings to disestablish rather 
than to preserve or establish paternity. But some end up as contests between the marital and 
biological fathers. See, e.g., Evans v. Wilson, 856 A.2d 679 (Md. 2004) (denying a paramour's 
attempt to establish paternity in light ofthe mother's husband's status as the legal father). 
6 DIY. OF REPROD. HEALTH, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION & SOC'Y FOR 
ASSISTED REPROD. TECH, AM. SOC'Y FOR REPROD. MED., 2001 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REpORTS 3 
(2003),availableathttp://www.cdc.gov/ART/ARTOIIPDF/ART2001.pdf(noting that "ART 
includes all fertility treatments in which both eggs and sperm are handled," including in vitro 
fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, and zygote intrafallopian transfer). 
7 This conclusion is drawn from information about the extraordinary costs of artificial 
reproductive technology and, to a lesser extent, the costs of private adoption. See, e.g., Lori 
B. Andrews,Reproductive Technology Comes of Age, 21 WHfITIERL.REv. 375, 377 (1999) 
(describing the reproductive technology industry as having revenue exceeding four billion 
dollars annually); Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable?, Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment, 
89 CORNELLL. REv. 1121, 1135-38 (2004) (describing the high costs of fertility treatments, 
as well as the fact that they are not usually covered by insurance, and analyzing the deduct-
ibility of such costs for federal income tax purposes); Kathy M. Kristof, Aid Is Available to 
Help Ease Adoption Burden, L.A. TIMES, July 31,2005, at C2 (describing the efforts to assist 
parents with the high cost of private adoption and reporting that "[rJoughly 1 00,000 parents adopt 
in the U.S. each year, spending as much as $40,000 in the process."). 
8 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
9 One of the competing claims cases in which the biological parents "won" that captured 
media attention came to be known as the "Baby Jessica" case. See In re Clausen, 502N.W.2d 
649 (Mich. 1993). 
10 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); see also Storrow, supra note 3, at 602. 
11 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.18 (2000) (placing care-taking on the same level as marriage and 
biology in establishing parental rights). 
12 OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 109.119 (West 2001) (granting rights to a "person who estab-
lishes emotional ties creating child-parent relationship or ongoing personal relationship"). 
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one adult to share the rights and responsibilities of being a father or mother. 13 While 
courts have taken a variety of approaches in resolving these cases, decisions usually 
tum on interpretations of contracts, custody, adoption, or parentage law.14 Increas-
ingly, the principles in the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)15 or state variants of the 
UP A 16 are being adapted to address these cases. 
Less attention has been paid to a much larger, second category of cases - cases 
in which the law is faced with resolving the legal status of the one adult who may be 
available to serve as the legal mother or father. For fathers, these cases frequently 
arise in the context of establishing (or, in some cases, disestablishing) the paternity 
of children of unmarried parents. I? For mothers, these cases most often arise in the 
context of determining their legal status as biological mothers when the state has 
identified them as being at risk for abusing or neglecting their children. 18 These cases 
almost always involve mothers or fathers who are poor, often members of minority 
groups, and usually without legal representation in parentage establishment and/or 
disestablishment proceedings. 19 In these "orphan" cases, the governing rules or legal 
standards chosen by the legislature or courts will not be used to choose among 
potential parents; rather, the issue is whether anyone will serve as a child's parent. 
The law's response in both categories of cases will have an impact on the welfare 
of the children involved. In competing claims cases, the best interests of children 
seem to be served by policies that preserve relationships between children and the fit, 
loving adults in their lives rather than policies that rely on narrow definitions of 
parenthood based on marriage or biology alone.20 But "competing claims" cases, while 
capturing vast resources of the legal system and vast space in legal scholarship, have 
significantly different implications for child welfare than those cases where the 
decision can leave a child fatherless or motherless. While the adults involved may 
13 See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005)(holding that a child born 
to a same sex couple can have two mothers, both of whom have custody rights and support 
obligations). 
14 See Storrow, supra note 3, at 603-612,623-33 (summarizing the literature and analyz-
ing statutes and cases in which there are multiple contenders for legal mother and legal father). 
15 Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 (2002), available athttp://www.law.upenn.eduibIIJulc/ 
upalfinaI2002.htm. 
16 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7575 (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3 (West 
1998); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.300 (West 2002). 
17 See infra text accompanying note 72. 
18 See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
20 See, e.g., Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a 
Care-Based Standard, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 83, 143 (2004); see also Gilbert A. Holmes, 
The Tie that Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with 
P arent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REv. 358 (1994); Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving 
the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL'y & L. 505 (1998). 
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be devastated by any legal action limiting contact with children they love, children 
have proven to be surprisingly resilient in circumstances where several adults are 
fighting to stay in their lives.21 Making the "wrong choice" when deciding among 
potential volunteers for parenthood, therefore, presents fewer risks to the welfare of 
a child than a decision that may leave a child without any father or mother. Legal 
decisions that leave children permanently without a parent - without even a name 
to attach to mother or father - can have devastating effects on children.22 The harm 
is financial, emotional, and psychological.23 If our goal is to develop parentage laws 
that have child welfare as their central goal, we must focus greater attention on those 
cases that have the potential to leave a child motherless or fatherless or both. Reform-
ing parentage laws must begin with recognition that poor families experience the estab-
lishment and disestablishment of parentage differently from families with greater 
economic resources. For poor families, parentage issues are not usually resolved by 
careful and nuanced readings of private contracts or the UP A in proceedings where 
all parties are represented in full-fledged trials through appellate review. Rather, these 
issues get resolved in the crowded halls of hospitals, welfare offices, and juvenile 
courts where caseloads are large and few parties have lawyers.24 While child welfare 
is certainly an articulated goal of the governing law in these cases, this goal is often 
secondary to recouping state funds, ensuring "fairness" to non-biological fathers, and 
punishing "bad" mothers. 
I have argued elsewhere that the recent trends in child support and welfare law 
have put children at risk of losing fathers.25 These trends have resulted in a new defi-
nition of fatherhood based solely upon biology and are an 
21 See, e.g., Brian Dickerson, A Child's Life Shows Folly of Adults, Media, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS, Feb. 24, 2003 (describing "Baby Jessica" nine years after being taken from her pre-
adoptive home to live with her biological father as "a self-possessed 12-year-old who adores 
her parents" and "recognize[s] that in a world where many children lack even a single adult 
who cares about them, she and her sister have lucked out"), available at http:lnaw.gsu.edul 
ecunninghamlPRlJessicaUpdates.htm. 
The potential for harm for children in "competing claims" cases will, of course, vary de-
pending upon a variety of circumstances, including the level of and exposure to conflict, the 
age of the child, and the nature of the relationship with the claimants. See PSYCHOLOGY AND 
CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 115 (Lois A. Weithorn ed., 1987). 
22 At the University of Baltimore, the author directed a family law clinical program from 
1990-2004. See University of Baltimore School of Law Family Law Clinic, http:lnaw.ubalt. 
edulclinicslfamilylaw.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). The caseload included representation 
of children and parents in paternity establishment and disestablishment cases as well as abuse 
and neglect cases. 
23 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 2, at 365-69 (describing a case study from Maryland). 
24 See GUGGENHEIM, infra note 59. 
25 See Murphy, supra note 2. For similar arguments, see Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy 
Doesn't Want to Be Daddy Anymore: An Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 
YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 193 (2004), and Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences (pts. 1-3), 
37 FAM. L.Q. 35, 55, 69 (2003). 
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unintended consequence[] of three decades of ... legislation de-
signed to reform the nation's welfare system .... [A]pplied most 
aggressively against low-income fathers of children receiving 
public benefits, welfare-driven child support policies are pushing 
those fathers to seek disestablishment of paternity. In resolving 
these claims, courts and legislatures are reinstating ... a definition 
of fatherhood grounded in biology that ignores other potential bases 
for fatherhood-based caretaking. As a result, children are becom-
ing fatherless . . . .26 
973 
While reversing these developments may require a fundamental shift in our approach 
to welfare, I have argued for incremental changes in child support and public benefits 
law to achieve "the overarching goal of keeping fathers in children's lives.'027 
In this Article, the focus shifts to mothers and the laws that establish and dis-
establish the maternal rights of poor women. The Article examines patterns of state 
intervention in child abuse and neglect law that determine the legal recognition of 
motherhood for these women. It concludes that current child welfare rules and 
policies promote the loss of birthmothers in poor children's lives, often with no long-
term maternal substitute for affected children. The Article also notes that focusing 
on parentage laws alone cannot preserve fit mothers (or fathers) in children's lives. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of this exercise, the Article highlights the policies 
that have removed mothers from their children and urges a shift in policy direction. 
Finally, the Article concludes with some principles to guide the formulation of 
parentage laws that have as their primary goal protecting poor children by keeping 
mothers in their lives. 
I. ESTABLISHING AND PRESERVING THE LEGAL STATUS OF MOTHERS 
Historically, the maternal presumption provided that a woman who gives birth to 
a child is that child's mother under the law. 28 This presumption no longer answers all 
issues concerning the legal status of mothers. While the UP A and its state variants29 
are beginning to displace this assumption to resolve issues concerning maternal status, 
the application of such rules is primarily relevant to competing claims in cases involv-
ing same sex partners, ART, or both. For poor women and children, the laws that 
26 Murphy, supra note 2, at 329-30 (footnotes omitted). 
27 Id. at 331. 
28 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (holding that a woman's maternity is verifiable 
from the birth itself). 
29 See supra note 16. 
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detennine maternal status are more often those federaeo and state31 laws that authorize 
the state to remove children, often as infants, and to terminate maternal parental rights. 
A. The Diminishing Impact of Biology and Its Impact on Children 
For low-income men, biology (and economic support) has increasingly defined 
fatherhood under the law. 32 For poor women, the legal defmition of motherhood seems 
to be moving in the opposite direction. Many would argue that the biological con-
nection between mothers and children is even more profound than that between 
biological fathers and their children.33 Despite this, biology is de-emphasized under 
current child welfare law, the law that most frequently defines motherhood for poor 
women.34 For children of poor biological mothers, the maternal presumption of legal 
parenthood at birth is being increasingly displaced under federal and state child wel-
fare law by an idealized notion of motherhood to be created and recognized through 
adoption. 
Poor women, particularly African American women, have a history of losing 
their children in juvenile court child protection proceedings. This history is well-
documented: 
[F]rom their inception, child welfare programs focused on poor 
children. The children of single mothers (particularly women of 
30 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, III Stat. 2115 (codified 
as amended in scatted sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
31 State laws governing child protection proceedings are often divided between those stan-
dards, usually vague and indeterminate, that permit removal of children and somewhat more 
specific standards that permit termination of parental rights. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CrS. 
& JUD. PROC. § § 3-801-830 (LexisNexis 2006) (governing the removal of children for alleged 
abuse or neglect); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-301 (LexisNexis 2006) (governing the 
termination of parental rights). 
32 See generally Murphy, supra note 2. 
33 See, e.g., Nancy Erickson, The Mother's Rights Must Take Priority, 2 L. & lNEQ. 447 
(1984). Of course, in the rarified world of ART, where the biological connection may be 
limited to egg donation, there may be no difference grounded in biology between the maternal 
and paternal child bond. 
34 When parental rights are terminated to make a child theoretically available for adop-
tion, the parental rights of biological fathers are also terminated. But, for a variety of reasons, 
the cases that end up in child welfare proceedings rarely involve fathers who are actively 
involved with their children and, thus, do not have the same impact on children's relationship 
with fathers. See Leigh Goodmark, Achieving Batterer Accountability in the Child Protection 
System, 93 Ky. L.J. 613, 614-15 (2004); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: 
Conflicting Definitionsfrom Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNElLL. 
REv. 689, 708-09 (1998) (attributing the lack of participation of fathers in child protection 
proceedings to the fact that women are more often primary caretakers and noting that in child 
protection cases, very little attention is paid by the state to ensuring fathers' presence). 
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color) are particularly at risk of removal. Living in a single-parent 
household increases the risk that a child will live in poverty. Both 
poverty and the loss of regular contact with both parents pose 
risks to child welfare. Many commentators have suggested, how-
ever, that intervention results, at least in part, from the child 
welfare system's adherence to the traditional idealized definition 
of the "good mother" rather than from thorough investigations and 
documentation of child abuse and neglect. 35 
For example, Bernardine Dohrn has explained: 
From the beginning, the juvenile courts and the broader social 
welfare system intervened in the lives of destitute women to regu-
late and monitor their behavior, punish them for "deviant" mother-
ing practices, and police the undeserving poor. Women were 
locked at the center of the private sphere of the family; their sole 
responsibility was to produce healthy offspring and provide for the 
well-being of men. Poor women, single women, and women who 
worked outside the home failed, by definition, to meet this respon-
sibility. The legal and social welfare apparatus developed to regu-
late and punish these "bad" mothers by "saving" their children?6 
975 
This bias against poor mothers has increased as the emphasis in such proceedings 
has shifted from preservation of the birthfamily to swifter termination of parental 
rights and adoption.3? Child advocates, social scientists, and legislators have long 
recognized that allowing children who have been removed from their mother's care 
to move from placement to placement in "foster care drift" is harmful to children.38 
Study after study demonstrates the importance of permanenc~9 and the dangers of 
35 Murphy, supra note 34, at 708-09 (footnotes omitted). 
36 [d. at 709 (quoting Bemardine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: 
Children at the Margins, 2 U. Cm. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1,6 (1995) (footnotes omitted)). 
37 See Mary O'Flynn, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: Changing Child 
Welfare Without Addressing Parental Substance Abuse, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTHL. &POL'Y 
243,247 (1999); Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, Race, and New Directions in Child Welfare 
Policy, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 63,64 (1999); Deborah L. Sanders, Toward Creating a 
Policy of Permanence for America's Disposable Children: The Evolution of Federal Foster 
Care Funding Statutes from 1961 to Present, 29 J. LEGIS. 51, 72 (2002). 
38 See Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv .423,423-24 
(1983). 
39 One of the most influential of these studies is found in the landmark work of psycholo-
gists Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., 
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHUD 17-20 (1979). 
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foster care for children.4O While this knowledge once led to federal and state policies 
designed to limit state intervention and reunify mothers and children, the persistent 
problem oflarge numbers of children remaining for extended periods of time in foster 
care led to a dramatic shift in state policy.41 Many experts believed the failure was 
not in the policies favoring reunification but in the failure to implement them.42 
Rather than focus on ensuring meaningful services to needy families, the political 
response to the child welfare failures was to limit rather than expand the obligation 
to provide those services.43 
B. Motherhood Through Adoption: The Impact of ASFA on Poor Children and 
Mothers 
This shift from policies favoring reunification to policies encouraging quicker 
termination of parental (maternal) rights and adoption culminated with the enactment 
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA).44 Under ASFA, states' 
receipt of federal funds is conditioned upon establishing procedures that make child 
welfare bureaucracies move more quickly to rule out parents as caretakers, making 
children available for adoption sooner. Hearings to determine permanent placement 
of children removed from parents must now begin no later than twelve months after 
a child enters foster care, a reduction from the former eighteen-month limit.45 Termi-
nating parental rights for a child is required if the child has been removed from her 
40 The findings of the court in Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N. Y. 2(03), 
are instructive: 
Another serious implication of removal is that it introduces children to 
the foster care system which can be much more dangerous and debili-
tating than the home situation. Dr. Stark testified that foster homes are 
rarely screened for the presence of domestic violence, and that the inci-
dence of abuse and child fatality in foster homes in New York City is 
double that in the general population. Children in foster care often fail 
to receive adequate medical care. Foster care placements can disrupt 
the child's contact with community, school and siblings. 
Id. at 199 (citations omitted). 
41 See, e.g., Hilary Baldwin, Termination o/Parental Rights: Statistical Study and Proposed 
Solutions, 28 J. LEGIS. 239, 251 (2002) (referring to the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare 
Actof1980, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2155, as an attemptto limit children's time in foster 
care). 
42 See, e.g., id. 
43 For example, when members of Congress debated ASFA, they collected evidence that 
lack of permanency resulted not because the "reasonable efforts" requirement had failed but 
because of "overworked caseworkers [who] believed that children already in foster care were 
safe and thus gave them and their families 'less attention than they deserved.'" Id. at 257. 
44 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2155. 
45 See 42 U.S.c. § 675(5)(C) (2005). 
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home for fifteen of the last twenty-two months, or when an infant has been abandoned, 
unless a compelling reason not to terminate parental rights exists.46 ASFA permits 
states to bypass family reunification efforts entirely for those children subjected to 
severe abuse or neglect.47 It also provides incentive payments to increase the number 
of adoptions and new funding for states to promote and support adoptions.48 Stich 
incentives are not provided for reunification with parents or other permanency plans 
such as kinship care.49 
Although there has been a modest decrease in children in foster care in the last 
few years, the numbers are still alarmingly high and the numbers entering care have 
continued to increase each year from 2000 through 2004.50 As was true under its 
predecessor statutes, the vast majority of children removed from their homes under 
ASFA are children of color 1 who are removed because of parental heglect related 
46 42 U.S.c. § 675(5)(E). 
47 42 U .S.C. § 671 (a)( 15)(A), (D). State law defines aggravating circumstances, but aban-
donment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse are generally included. 
48 Under ASFA, the federal government pays states $4,000 multiplied by the amount by 
which the number of foster child adoptions in the state during the fiscal year exceeds a base 
number of foster child adoptions. See 42 U.S.c. § 673b(d)(I)(A). 
49 In fact, states receive substantially more money when they remove kids than when they 
prevent removal. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 672-74. 
50 Children's Def. Fund, Child Abuse and Neglect Fact Sheet 2 (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter 
Fact Sheet] (finding that the number of children placed in foster care increased by thirty 
percent in the last decade), available at http://www.childrensdefensefund.org/childwelfare/ 
abuse/factsheet2005.pdf. But see Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 
Trends in Foster Care and Adoption - FY 2000-2004, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/trends.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2006) (finding that while 
the number of children entering foster care increased between 2000 to 2004, the overall 
number of children in foster care has decreased from 552,000 in 2000 to .518,000 in 2004). 
Of course, the pattern of removing children rather than providing services to children in their 
parents' care cannot be attributed entirely to the shortened timeframes in ASFA. As one 
federal court found, increased media scrutiny after horrific deaths of children in foster care has 
also contributed to this pattern: 
Much of the actual policies as applied by ACS are driven by fear of an 
untoward incident of child abuse that will result in criticism of the agency 
and some of its employees. The concern over institutional self-protection, 
rather than children's best interests, explains a good deal of ACS's pre-
disposition toward counterproductive separation of abused mothers and 
their children. 
Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153,205 (E.n.N.Y. 2002). 
51 See Fact Sheet, supra note 50, at 2 (reporting that at least fifty-nine percent of children 
in foster care are children of color). Children of color are disproportionately represented in the 
foster care system, as children of color only comprise forty-two percent of all children under 
the age of eighteen in the United States. See Child Welfare League of Am., Nat'l Data 
Analysis Sys., Children of Color in the Child Welfare System, available at http://ndas.cwla. 
org/research_info/rninority _child (last visited Jan. 3, 2006). Among children of color, "[b ]lack 
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to poverty.52 Most recently, courts and commentators have recognized that within 
this group of poor children, large numbers of children of battered mothers have suf-
fered from unnecessary separation from their mothers in child protection proceed-
ings. In a recent case in which a class of mothers and children challenged the New 
York City's Administration for Children's Services' (ACS) policy of bringing neglect 
actions against battered mothers, the court found: 
The statistics, individual cases, expert testimony and admis-
sions of ACS employees demonstrate that many more separations 
of abused mothers and their children are made by ACS than are 
necessary for protection of the children .... In a large number of 
instances ACS removes children first and then seeks court ap-
proval. Many such non-court ordered separations are unnecessary 
and result in long periods of anguish for both mother and child 
before the courts can reinstate the mother-child relationship. 53 
children represent sixteen percent of the general population but 37 percent of the foster care 
popUlation." Fact Sheet, supra, at 2 (emphasis added). 
52 See Martin Guggenheim, Somebody' s Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child 
Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1716, 1735 (2000) (finding that as many as seventy per-
cent of children in foster care have suffered no abuse and could remain at home with the 
adequate provision offinancial services); Paul Anthony Wilhelm, Note, Permanency at What 
Cost? Five Years of Imprudence Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 16 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 617, 631 (2002) (citing estimates that ten percent 
of children in foster care are there because of serious abuse); see also DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE 
WELFARE OF CHILDREN 139-56 (1994) (analyzing child welfare studies and concluding that 
lack of income, not abuse, is the main reason most children are removed from their homes); 
Fact Sheet, supra note 50, at 1-2. 
Research indicates that children who live in families with annual in-
comes less than $15,000 are 22 times more likely to abused or neglected 
than children living in families with annual incomes of$30,000 or more. 
This higher rate can be attributed to the stress that poverty places on 
parents and to the increased likelihood that child abuse and neglect will 
be detected, reported and substantiated in low-income homes that are 
more closely supervised by social services and law enforcement agencies. 
Id. at 1 (citations omitted). 
53 Nicholson, 203 F. SUpp. 2d at 212,214. See also Failure to Protect Working Group, 
Charging BatteredMotherswith "Failure to Protect": Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM 
URB. LJ. 849, 872 (2000). 
Id. 
[Domestic violence] advocates now find themselves assisting battered 
mothers who are losing their children to foster care and who are being 
charged with abuse or neglect for failing to protect their children from 
witnessing domestic violence. Mothers are punished and children are 
traumatized by the separation while the perpetrator of the violence gen-
erally experiences few consequences. 
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Furthermore, less than six out of ten children who are removed receive post-
investigation services. 54 Not only are services not provided through the narrowed 
"reasonable efforts" requirement that remained under ASFA, poor families also exper-
ienced dramatic cutbacks in general public support throughout the post-ASFA period. 55 
The lack of services and strict timelines under ASF A has led to record numbers of 
mothers losing their status as parents through termination of parental rights. 56 
Given the apparent inevitability that certain mothers will lose that legal status 
through termination proceedings under ASF A, why not prevent harm to children 
from lack of permanency by refusing to confer legal recognition on mothers who are 
poor, substance abusers, or otherwise meet a profile of likely social services inter-
vention? Why not make those parents take affIrmative steps to "earn" the right to 
attain legal status as mothers? Won't that fInally put child welfare at the center of 
parentage laws? The results for children under the accelerated approach under 
ASF A suggest the answer to these questions is no. While some children would clearly 
benefIt from the possibility of immediate adoption, many more would suffer under 
such a system. 
54 CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S.DEP'ToFIiEALrn&HUMANSERVS.,CHllDMALTREATMENT 
2003 ch. 6, available at http://acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm03/chaptersix.htm (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2006). 
55 See CHILDREN's DEF. FuND, THE UNPROTECTED RECESSION: RECORD NUMBERS OF 
FAMILIES HAVE No WORK AND No WELFARE IN 2001 (2003), available at http://www. 
childrensdefense.orglpdf/noworknowelfare.pdf; JENNIFER MEZY ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POUCY PRIORITIES, REVERSING DIRECTION ON WELFARE REFORM: PRESIDENT'S BUDGET 
CUTS CHILD CARE FOR MORE THAN 300,000 CHILDREN (Feb. 10, 2004) (noting that cuts in 
federal funding for child care will gravely impact working families and families seeking to 
make the transition from welfare to work), available at http://www.cbpp.orgl2-10-04wel. 
htm; Nina Bernstein, Swelling Shelters, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, at B3; Nina Bernstein, Use 
of Shelters by Families Sets Record in City, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1,2001, at 1 (''The number of 
homeless families lodging nightly in New York City'S shelter system has risen higher than 
ever and the trend is accelerating .... "); Press Release, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, 
Many Low-Income Families Would Lose Federal Housing Assistance Under Proposed 
Funding Cuts: New Projections Show Potential Effects in Each Community (Mar. 17,2004), 
available at http://www.cbpp.orgl3-17-04hous-pr.htrn. 
56 See CHllDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T oFHEALrn & HUMAN SERVS., AFCARS REPoRT 
#9-CURRENTEsTIMATESASOFAUGUST2004,availableathttp://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs! 
cb/dis/afcars/publications/afcars.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (finding that by September 30, 
2002,67,000 children became wards of the state through termination of their parental rights). 
This trend occurred even before AFSA as the political tide began to swing in favor of adoption. 
See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of 
Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care - An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 F AM. 
L.Q. 121, 127-32 (1995) (analyzing data from two states - New York and Michigan - and 
finding an ''unmistakable trend" of increasing numbers of children becoming wards of the state 
through policies that overemphasize "termination of parental rights as a major tool of perma-
nency planning"). 
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Since its enactment, commentators have expressed concern about ASF A's impact 
on families, particularly ppor women. 57 Despite the tendency to pit mothers' and 
children's interests against one another, when mothers suffer, their children are 
harmed.58 Law professor and child welfare attorney Martin Guggenheim has ex-
plored the "flawed pr~rnise" underlying the notion of "children's rights" as separate 
from "parents rights": 
Regrettably, a leading characteristic of the children's rights 
movement is its propensity to separate children's interests from 
their parents'. It is also its most egregious error. 
Children are inherently dependent for much of the time they 
remain in the category of "child. " For this reason, it is highly prob-
lematic to discuss the rights of children in a wide variety of con-
texts without simultaneously considering the rights of the people 
on whom they are dependent. In this culture, this means their 
57 Predictions that ASFA might hurt parents and children began during its debate in 
Congress. See, e.g., The Safe Adoptions and Family Environments Act: Hearing to Consider 
S.511 Before the S(!nate Comm. on Finance, 105th Congo 54, 62 (1997) (statement of Sister 
Rose Logan, Catholic Charities USA) ("[T]here is a danger that [ASFA's] very strong em-
phasis on adoption ... will be a signal to state and local officials that they don't have to do 
anything to reunite families or keep them together, even when the abuse or neglect is not 
chronic or severe. "); see also Adoption and Support of Abused Children: Testimony Submitted 
to the Senate Finance Comm.for the Hearing on the Pass Act, S.1195, 105th Congo 141, 
147-48 (1997) (statement of the Child Welfare League of America) (stating that the com-
bination of ASFA's stringent time limits and failure to increase preventive or reunification 
services may result in prematurely sending a child home or unnecessarily terminating parental 
rights). 
58 See, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Interqependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA 
CLARAL. REv. 957 (1999) (proposing an "interdependency theory," in which "every child 
needs a caregiver, and every caregiver needs support from other people and institutions," to 
serve children's best interests); Marsha Garrison, Parents' Rights vS. Children's Interests: 
The Case of the Foster Child, 22 N.Y.U.REv. L. &Soc. CHANGE 371, 373 (1996) (rejecting 
the perceived conflict between parents' and children's rights given "the general emphasis on 
relationship protection that has characterized advocacy on behalf of children"); see also 
Nicholson V. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153,235 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
The interest in not being forcibly separated by the state is shared by 
parents and children. This right to the preservation of family integrity 
encompasses the reciprocal rights of both parent and children. It is the 
interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or 
her children, and of the children in not being dislocated from the emo-
tional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association 
with the parent. 
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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parents. Attempting to consider the rights and needs of (very 
young) children without simultaneously taking into account the 
rights and needs of their parents is akin to attempting to isolate 
someone's arm from the rest of their body. 59 
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But even if one accepts the premise of "children's rights" and considers ASFA 
strictly from a child's perspective, its harm to children as a form of parentage dis-
establishment law is apparent. The impact on children begins with the removal stage. 
Few would argue that ASFA's exemption of cases of severe abuse from family pres-
ervation requirements does anything but protect children who need state intervention 
to protect them. But, for the majority of these children who may be removed un-
necessarily or could be reunified with the "reasonable efforts" required by law, this 
approach is not in their best interests. The disruption and loss of a primary caretaker 
- in this case overwhelmingly biological mothers - is devastating to children.60 
And, given the record numbers of parental rights terminations under ASFA, we know 
that few of these children are reunified with their parents.61 And there is little 
evidence that removal will result in permanency. While adoptions have increased 
under ASF A, 62 these adoptions have not kept pace with the number of children left 
S9 MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHllDREN'S RIGHTS 13-14 (2005). 
60 Again, the record in Nicholson provides substantial evidence of the harm to children 
when removed from their primary caretakers: 
Several expert witnesses ... testified about the primacy of the parent-child 
bond and the effect on a child if he or she is separated from a parent. ... 
The attachment between parent and child forms the basis of who we are 
as humans and the continuity of that attachment is essential to a child's 
natural development. 
Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 198-99. See also Joseph Goldstein, Medical Carefor the Child 
at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.1. 645, 649-50 (1977). 
No other animal is for so long after birth in so helpless a state that its sur-
vival depends on continuous nurture by an adult. Although breaking or 
weakening the ties to the responsible and responsive adults may have 
different consequences for children of different ages, there is little doubt 
that such breach in the familial bond will be detrimental to the child's 
well-being. 
Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 199 (quoting Goldstein, supra, at 649-50). The author's own 
experience representing children, parents, and other caretakers in the child protection system 
confirms these studies. One visit to a juvenile court waiting room, where children in foster 
care have the opportunity to visit with their birth parents from whose homes they have been 
removed, would illustrate this point. 
61 See supra note 56. 
62 In the year prior to ASFA, 31,000 children were adopted. In the 2000 fiscal year, more 
than 45,000 children were adopted. See M. Carmela Welte, Adoption and Safe Families Act: 
Has It Made a Difference?, CONNECTION, Summer 2003, available at http://casanet.org! 
library/adoptionlafsa-has-made-a-difference.htm. 
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without parents because of terminations under ASF A. 63 The children left behind in 
permanent foster care status are disproportionately African American and, as they 
age, are practically unadoptable.64 
Given this experience, there is considerable risk to children in requiring mothers 
to seek state intervention to establish parentage. If ASF A is any indicator, such a re-
quirement would result in substantially more children becoming orphans, with all the 
attendant harm. Past experience with child protection courts in this country reveals 
that when poor mothers are before the court, they will face a system where race and 
economic status of the mothers are the best predictors of whether their children will 
be removed from them and whether they will ultimately lose their parental rights.65 
Just as we cannot expect dramatic changes in the amount of funding for fragile 
families,66 changes in parentage laws cannot remove patterns of bias in the child 
welfare bureaucracies and court systems. And we know that children suffer when 
they are removed from their birthmothers.67 This is true even if they are placed in 
good, stable foster care.68 But they suffer even more when, as is more commonly the 
case, children experience several placements in substandard care.69 
The failure of ASF A to accomplish widespread permanency for poor children 
through adoption makes it clear that, even if the goal of ideal parentage through adop-
tion is accepted, such a goal is achievable for relatively few children. Some children 
will inevitably have to be removed from the care of abusive and chronically unfit 
63 Fact Sheet, supra note 50, at 2 (noting that 532,000 children were reported to be in 
foster care as of September 30, 2002). 
64 See Edmund Mech, Public Social Services to Minority Children and Their Families, 
in CHILDREN IN NEED OF ROOTS l33 (R.O. Washington & Joan Baros-Van Hull eds., 1985) 
(finding that once African American children enter foster care, they remain there longer, are 
moved more often, and receive less desirable placements than white children); see also Josh 
Green, Urban Inst., Who Will Adopt the Foster Care Children Left Behind? 1 (Urban Inst.! 
Caring for Children Brief No.2, June 2003), available at http://www.urban.orglUploaded 
PDF/3108093aringjor3hildren_2.pdf("Compared with children still in foster care, those 
who are adopted are younger and more likely to be female, Caucasian, and Hispanic .... 
[T]hose awaiting adoption tend to be ... older, male, and black .... " (citation omitted». 
65 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
66 It is, of course, difficult to resist advocating for increased funding for additional ser-
vices to poor families as a way to help promote fit, caring parents in all children's lives. Such 
funding is probably a political impossibility in the United States in 2006. But, in a country 
that spends at least $50 billion a year on federal funds for war, it seems at least plausible that 
increases in the $16-17 billion for public benefits to poor families could be made. See Office 
of Mgm't & Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007 1 (2006), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov /omb/budget/fy2007 /pdf/budget/defense. pdf. 
67 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
68 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
69 See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 41, at 250,254 (noting that most children are placed in 
more than one foster family and "the detrimental affect [sic] of foster care on children"); see 
also supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
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parents, even if such removal results in permanent foster care. The best hope for the 
remaining children, however, is to focus efforts on reunification. Changes in parent-
age laws for mothers - the child welfare scheme - should, therefore, shift focus to 
ensure fulfillment of reasonable efforts mandate so as to increase opportunities for 
reunification and limit state intervention. 
CONCLUSION 
The matter of determining what categories of people will best fill the role of legal 
parents is extremely complex. Designing an ideal parentage statute will not address 
all of the complex political and socio-economic issues that affect the legal recognition 
of parents in this country. Even if the focus is limited to what laws would best pro-
mote fit, caring parents in children's lives, legal reform must go beyond parentage 
laws. A wide range of legal regulation determines who may acquire and maintain the 
status of legal parent, particularly for the poor and African Americans. 
This Article has focused on one group of children - those facing legal proceed-
ings in which they are at risk of losing their mothers, often the only parent in their 
lives. Even among this group, the range of circumstances in individual families is 
broad. But, as a starting point for designing parentage laws that have child welfare 
as their primary and overarching goal, we must ensure existing laws do not leave 
children without mothers unless that result is absolutely required to protect the child 
from harm. The following proposals are intended to further that goal by guiding the 
reform of the cross section of rules, policies, and statutes that regulate maternal status 
in poor families. 
A. Initial Recognition of Legal Parenthood Should Occur Under Established 
Presumptions Without the Needfor Significant State Intervention 
Requiring an affirmative showing of fitness before legal recognition of parental 
status will hurt poor children. Their parents (a) lack the resources to participate mean-
ingfully in court proceedings to meet such legal burdens/o and (b) face bias and 
70 As a general proposition, unless there is a statutory right to counsel for parents in child 
welfare cases, poor mothers are unlikely to be represented by counsel in legal proceedings 
involving access to their children. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency 
Program? A Modest Proposal in Response to the Burdens Created by Self-Represented 
Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 105, 110 (2001) (describing a 1991-92 study of 
sixteen large urban areas nationwide that found that seventy-two percent of all domestic 
relations cases involved at least one unrepresented party); see also DEP'T OF FAM. ADMIN, 
MD. JUDICIARY, ANNuAL REpORT OF THE MARYLAND CIRCUIT COURT FAMILY DMSIONS 
AND FAMILY SERVICES PROGRAMS 30 (2003) (reporting that sixty-four percent of litigants 
in family disputes in Maryland were self-represented), available at http://www.courts.state. 
md.usl family/annualreport03.pdf. Even where counsel is appointed, the potential for mothers 
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prejudice in legal proceedings where they are at risk of arbitrary exclusion as parents 
based on race and economic statuS.71 
B. The Unalterable Differences in Prenatal Investment Between Mothers and 
Fathers Require Gender-Specific Laws for Initial Recognition of Parenthood 
Notwithstanding the need to protect both poor mothers and poor fathers from the 
risks of state intervention to establish parental status, laws affecting parentage should 
recognize that the different circumstances of biological mothers and fathers require 
some modest affirmative steps on the part of fathers to establish parentage that are not 
imposed on mothers who achieve that status by giving birth. These steps include 
requiring an affidavit or consent to judgment to establish legal paternity after the state 
has fully informed putative fathers of the legal consequences of such action, includ-
ing advising such fathers of the importance and availability without cost of genetic 
testing.72 
C. The Birthmother Shall Be the Presumed Mother of Her Child 
Given the risk of harm to children from extended foster care that still routinely 
follows removal of children, the state's burden in rebutting the maternal presumption 
must be made greater and more specific. To achieve that heightened burden, the 
court must make a meaningful inquiry to determine that the state (a) has met its 
burden to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child with her birthmother, and (b) 
has demonstrated, to the extent possible, through the identification of an adoptive 
resource, that continued removal and termination of parental rights will provide 
greater benefits to the child than return to the birthparent. 73 
losing children through their lack of understanding and inability to fully participate in legal 
proceedings is high. See, e.g., In re Blessen H., 877 A.2d. 161 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) 
(rejecting a mother's challenge of her attorney's waiver of a right to a contested hearing in 
a "Child in Need of Assistance" proceeding where the mother claimed the waiver was not 
"knowing and intelligent"). 
71 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
72 These steps for establishing paternity are more fully described in Murphy, supra note 
2, at 375-77. 
73 The state's ability to ensure that children will not lose biological mothers without a 
guarantee of adoption have been improved by new laws in a few states that create proceed-
ings where a biological parent can consent to the termination of parental rights on the con-
dition that a child is adopted by a specific family, often a relative. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., 
FAM. LAW § 5-320(b )(1); see also Joan Little, Major Changes in Adoption Laws Will Speed 
Adoptions in CINA Cases, MD. FAM. MONTHLY, Jan. 2006, at 5. 
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D. Opportunities Should Be Offeredfor Poor Families to Make Their Own 
Decisions About Parentage Issues 
985 
Agreements that are not harmful to children and maintain the involvement of 
multiple parents and "parent figures" in a child's life should be recognized and sub-
stituted for judicially imposed decisions. While legitimate questions have been raised 
about the risks to the less powerful when decisions are made in the relatively private 
and informal mediation setting, the value of mediation as a way of resolving the kind 
of parentage disputes described in this paper is worth considering.74 "Family group 
conferencing,,75 in child protection cases can also be a way to restore a central role 
for birthparents in the decision-making about their children's long-term care. Some 
states have enacted legislation that provides for legal recognition of agreements that 
permit contact between biological parents and their children after the formal termi-
nation of parental rights.76 These laws should increase the potential for using these 
forms of alternative dispute resolution to maintain the presence of mothers in their 
children's lives. 
74 A Hastings Center study looking at "the ethical, social, and legal issues surrounding 
DNA-based identity testing as it affects families" notes some preliminary positive experience 
with mediation in paternity cases. See Mary R. Anderlik, Disestablishment Suits: What Hath 
Science Wrought?, 4 J. CrR. FAMS., CHIlD. &Crs. 3, 3 (2003). See also id. at 19 (describing 
judicial opinions in California and Maine in which mediation was proffered as a way to re-
solve in a paternity dispute). The author's experience in representing children in paternity 
disestablishment cases supports the notion that court-based mediation programs may have 
some potential for reaching decisions that serve the best interests of children. See Murphy, 
supra note 2, at 368 n.207 (describing the resolution of a case in which, despite limitations 
in the governing law that would have produced a different decision, the parties reached an 
agreement preserving a father in a child's life). 
75 See Susan M. Chandler & Marilou Giovannucci, Family Group Conferences: Trans-
forming Traditional Child Welfare Policy and Practice, 42 FAM. Cr. REv. 216 (2004) (de-
scribing the positive consequences for children when child welfare cases are resolved by 
bringing together birth families, extended families and relevant community resources); see 
also Hon. Leonard P. Edwards, Mediation in Child Protection Cases, J. CTR. FAMS., CHIlD. 
& CTS. 57 (2004) (describing the problems with the traditional adversarial process for resolv-
ing child abuse and neglect proceedings, and promoting the use of mediation that broadly 
defines and includes the parties in interests, promotes child safety, and produces agreements 
that require little orno post-agreement state supervision or intervention). But see Amy Sinden, 
"Why Won't Mom Cooperate?": A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339 (1999) (warning about the dangers to mothers when child 
protection proceedings are marked by informality). 
76 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-308(a)(I) (2006). Of course, the potential 
still exists that mothers will feel coerced to consent to termination of their parental rights by 
trading the guarantee of some contact with their children for the possibility of no contact after 
complex legal proceedings in which they may be unrepresented or poorly represented by 
counsel. 
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These suggested reforms are not intended to resolve the range of parentage issues 
courts must face in cases where more than one adult is competing for the status of 
legal mother, nor do they address some of the broader structural issues in welfare and 
child support laws that contribute to the loss of parents in children's lives. Rather, 
they are principles by which to measure the impact of laws affecting maternal status 
on children who most need protection. 
